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Understanding Nominal GNP
Targeting
FIROUGHOUT 1989, popular wisdom held
that the U.S. monetary authority was faced with
a daunting policy task: it should not permit too
much money growth and cause prices to rise
too rapidly, but it should not allow too little
money growth and cause the economy to tip in-
to recession as real output would fall. Sympathy
for monetary policymakers, however, is not
necessarily widespread among economists. Many
economists deny that the tradeoff between infla-
tion and output growth exists in the long run.
Moreover, even those who grudgingly agree
that the tradeoff may exist in the short run
contend that monetary policymakers create pro-
blems for themselves by attempting to exploit
the possible output-inflation tradeoff.
What alternative policy guidelines exist? Among
a variety of alternatives, there has been recent
emphasis on something called nominal income
targeting.t Using this approach, the monetary
authority would ignore the presumed trade-off
between inflation and real output growth; in-
stead, it would simply adjust money stock
growth to achieve some targeted level or growth
rate in nominal GNP. In this paper, we examine
this policy alternative. We first make the theo-
retical case favoring nominal GNP targeting.
Given this theory, we then turn to the practical
aspects of targeting nominal GNP.
TARGETING NOMINAL GNP: THE
THEORY
In this section, we set out the theoretical case
favoring nominal GNP targeting. In doing so, we
abstract from technical and operational pro-
blems and focus instead on the implications of
nominal GNP targeting for stabilizing price and
output within a widely used macroeconomic
model. Later we will return to the issue of how
to actually set up and utilize nominal GNP
targeting.
Naturally, the economic implications of alter-
native monetary policies depend to a large ex-
tent on the macroeconomic framework being
used for the analysis. We employ a particular
version of what is perhaps the most widely
used framework for analyzing macroeconomic
15ee McCallum (1987), McNees (1987), Carlson (1988) or












fluctuations, the textbook aggregate supply-
demand model.
A Stochastic Aggregate Supply-
Demand Model
A graphical representation of the textbook ag-
gregate demand-supply model is given in fig-
ure 1. This model specifies that the aggregate
price level (P) and the level of real output (Q)
are set by the intersection of the aggregate
supply and demand curves. As figure 1 shows,
the aggregate demand curve slopes downward;
that is, there is an invet’se relationship between
the aggregate price level and the demand for
real output. This inverse relationship can arise
for either of two reasons. As the price level
rises, the purchasing power of money balances
declines, reducing wealth and hence reducing
the quantity of consumption goods demanded.
In addition, the higher price level leads to an in-
crease in the quantity of nominal money de-
manded because the higher prices require
larger average money balances to purchase the
same real quantity of goods and services. In-
creased money demand bids up the interest
rate, and higher interest rates imply less con-
sumption and investment spending.2
The aggregate supply curve slopes upward in
figure 1. There are several explanations for the
positive slope of the aggregate supply curve. We
concentrate on a particular, widely used ex-
planation: that the nominal wages of workers
are set by agreement for a fixed period of time
and the amount of employment is determined
by the employer. This agreement can either be
a formal contract or an informal handshake
(also called an implicit contract) between labor
and management; in either case, nominal wages
adjust slowly to unexpected changes in the
economic environment. As a result, profits rise
as prices rise and fall as prices fall. Firms res-
pond to these changes in pr’ofits by appropriate
changes in output and ernployment.~
This response does not describe the situation
relevant for expected changes in the economic
environment, however, because ex~ctedchanges
are taken into account when nominal wage
agreements are made. Thus, figure 1 also in-
cludes a vertical line labeled QFI, which indicates
the supply curve r’elevant when expected changes
occur. The superscript F] stands for “full infor-
mation,” to indicate that this is the supply curve
applicable when the only changes in the eco-
nomic environment are those expected to occur
when wage agreements were signed. Notice that
this curve does not show a direct relationship
between price and quantity. In fact, it shows
that, for expected changes, the relevant supply
curve is vertical at the output level labeled Cf.
‘I’he output level Cf does not change when
prices change because workers and firms, when
negotiating wage agreements, will adjust the
nominal wage to compensate for changes in the
price level. ‘I’hus, an expected increase in the
price level will be compensated by an increase
in the contracted nominal wage.
This vertical aggregate supply curve is a re-
flection of the “natural rate hypothesis.” The
2With the inflation rate held constant, the increase in the
nominal interest rate implies an equivalent increase in the
real interest rate.
tEarly versions of this theoretical approach were developed
by Fischer (1977) and Gray (1976). See Barro (1977) for a
criticism of this approach. Optimal fixed wage contracts
can be found from microeconomic contracting models
such as Azariadis (1975): these are models of fixed real
wage contracts that shift risk from workers to firms.
McCallum (1987) gives a pragmatic argument for the








natural rate hypothesis states that the full
employment level of output is independent of
the price level. In this model, the vertical line
tf represents the natural rate hypothesis.
Monetary policy works by inducing move-
merits in the aggregate demand curve. As the
nominal money stock rises, wealth rises and the
interest rate falls at any given price level; as a
result, the demand for goods rises. Graphically,
the aggregate demand curve shifts to the right.
Thus, expansionary policy (increases in the
money stock) shifts the aggregate demand curve
to the right, and contractionary policy (de-
creases in the money stock) shifts it to the left.
To illustrate what this model implies, consider
the results of an unexpected increase in ag-
gregate demand, illustrated in figure 2. Since
the short-run aggregate supply curve has a
positive slope, the aggregate demand increase
will produce increases in both price and output
until such time as wages are renegotiated. In
figure 2, the short-run equilibrium occurs at
point B, the intersection of the short-run ag-
gregate supply curve with the new, unexpected-
ly higher aggregate demand curve.
Of course, when wor-kers revise the ter’rns of
their- labor contracts in response to an unex-
pected rise in prices, nominal wages will rise
and the short-run aggregate supply curve will
shift 1°the left, until it intersects the new ag-
gregate demand curve at point C, where the de-
mand curve crosses the full information ag-
gregate supply curve. When workers become
fully informed and have changed their nominal
wage accordingly, changes in aggregate demand
result only in price level changes.
One implication of this analysis is that an ex-
pected increase in demand only produces
higher prices. In figure 2, this is illustrated by
the movement of the economy from the in-
tersection of the original aggregate demand
curve and Cf at point At othe intersection of
the new aggregate demand curve and Cf at
point C, without the intervening short-run
equilibtium at point B.
The analysis of a decline in aggregate demand
is symmetric to the above analysis. An unex-
pected decline in aggregate demand leads initial-
ly to lower prices and output on the short-run
aggregate supply curve at point 0. After firms
adjust workers’ nominal wages downward in re-
sponse to lower prices, the full information
level of output, point F, is achieved once more.
Unexpected changes in supply, termed supply
shocks, are different from demand shocks
because they shift both the short-run and the
full information aggregate supply curves. For
example, suppose that the negative supply shock
illustrated in figure 3 occurs, shifting both the










The short-run equilibrium occurs at point F, the
intersection of aggregate demand with the new
short-run aggregate supply curve. The full in-
formation output also declines from Q~ to Cf
because the supply shock has reduced the quan-
tity of output firms want to produce even if
wages and prices fully adjust to the shock. The
adjustment from short-run equilibrium at point
F to full information equilibrium at point G oc-
curs when workers renegotiate their nominal
wages upward, shifting the short-run supply
curve leftward again until it intersects the new
full information output level (~‘ at point G.
Why does the full information output level
shift in response to supply shocks? By defini-
tion, the full information output level is the one
that will be produced when the economy com-
pletely adjusts to any disturbance. Thus, a nega-
tive supply shock reduces the full information
level of output because it reduces the produc-
tive capacity of the economy.
Notice that a reduction in the full information
level of output need not be permanent. That
depends on the nature of the supply shock. If it
is only temporary, the full information output
level will return to Q~’ after the shock dissi-
pates. Nonetheless, the decline in Cf from Cf
to Q~ represents the reduction in potential out-
put, however temporary, that occurs in con-
junction with a negative supply shock.
Finally, the analysis of a positive supply shock
is symmetric to the analysis of a negative supply
shock. Consider a positive shock to supply. The
full information level of output shifts from Cf
to as the short-run aggregate supply curve
also shifts to the right. If the shock is unex-
pected, initial equilibrium is at point I, and after
all wage adjustments have been made, the econ-
omy will produce at the full information level of
output at point J.
Monetary Policy in the Aggregate
Demand-Supply .Model
The aggregate supply-demand framework we
employ assumes that random shocks occur to
both demand and supply curves. Demand
shocks include unexpected changes in business
or consumer confidence, income taxes, ex-
change rates, monetary policy or government
spending. These lead to unexpected changes in
one or more of the components of aggregate de-
mand: consumption, investment, government
spending and net exports. Supply shocks include
unexpected changes in the production process,
such as oil price surprises, droughts or techno-
logical change, that enhance or diminish the ag-
gregate quantity of goods supplied.
Before examining how monetary policy might
respond to these shocks, the goals of policy
must be discussed. We assume that the mone-
tary authority wants to stabilize the price level
and/or the level of output. In the model pre-
sented, the only level of real output that can be
achieved after wages have fully adjusted to
shocks is the full information level of output.
Furthermore, in the short run, before contracts
are renegotiated, output deviates from full in-
formation output only when shocks occur.
Thus, output stabilization implies that the
monetary policymaker seeks to stabilize output
at its full information level. In achieving this
goal, the policymaker attempts to keep output
where the private sector would produce if it
recognized and fully adjusted to the shocks
disturbing the economy.4
We consider three types of policy targets.
Price level targeting involves setting the money
stock so that the aggregate demand curve
strikes the aggregate supply curve at a point
like point A in figure 2. Thus, the price level
target might be P0. When demand or supply
shocks occur, the monetary authority will at-
tempt to maintain the short-run equilibrium
price level at P0. In contrast, real output target-
ing involves changing the money stock so that
the aggregate demand curve intersects the ag-
gregate supply curve at 0,0, the target level
for real output. Because the full information
output level, Cf, is the level that would be
achieved after all adjustments have taken place,
the monetary authority would set the real out-
put target at this value. Finally, nominal GNP
targeting involves setting the money stock so
that the product of the equilibrium price (P)
and equilibrium output (0,) equals the target for
nominal GNP, (P0,) Under this procedure, the
monetary authority does not attempt to deter-
mine the specific price and real output com-
ponents of nominal GNP; instead, the
policymaker is concerned with their product.
4The stochastic disturbances that affect the economy need
not all originate from factors exogenous to the policymak-
ers. Stochastic shocks that originate with unexpected
policy actions can also adversely impact the economy.
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What actions can be taken in the face of de-
mand and supply shocks? If aggregate demand
shifts unexpectedly to the right, as was illus-
trated in figure 2, stabilizing the price level re-
quires the policymaker to contract the money
stock; this would shift the aggregate demand
curve back to its original position and restore
the original price level, P0, at point A. This same
monetary policy response is also necessary to
stabilize either real output or nominal GNP.5
Thus, for demand shocks, the policy response is
identical regardless of the specific goal of the
policymaker. Because demand shocks move
prices and output in the same direction, a
policy that offsets price changes will also offset
output and nominal GNP movements simultane-
ously. This result is not true, however, for
supply shocks.
The graphical representation of a negative
supply shock is presented in figure 3. As the
supply shock shifts the aggregate supply curve
to the left (from AS0 to AS,), the resulting inci-
pient shortage of goods at the initial price level
puts upward pressure on the price level. The
rise in prices, which reduces the aggregate
quantity of goods demanded, continues until the
reduced quantity demanded is equal to the
lower quantity supplied (point F).
An important feature of this model is the rela-
tion between the intersection of the full infor-
mation output level and the short-run aggregate
supply curve for various values of the supply
shock. In figure 3, a negative supply shock
shifts both 0,” (from Q~ to Q’~’)and the short-
run aggregate supply curve to the left. The in-
itial intersection of short-run aggregate supply
arid full information output occurred at point A;
after the shock, these curves intersect at point
H. Similarly, a positive supply shock would shift
both 0,” (from Cf to Q”) and the short-run ag-
gr’egate supply to the right. In this case, short-
run aggregate supply and full information out-
put would intersect at point K after the shock.
It can he demonstrated that these intersec-
tions of short-run aggregate supply and full in-
formation output occur at the same level of
nominal spending. In other words, the value of
at point A, P,Q, at point H and P2ft at
point K are identical.°The dashed line connec-
ting these points contains all possible intersec-
tions of short-run aggregate supply and full in-
formation output after a supply shock, but with
the nominal wage held constant. Since these in-
tersection points are points of identical nominal
spending, the dashed line connecting them is
called a rectangular hyperbola. This result is
generated by the contract market structure of
the labor market; it is not a feature of all ag-
gregate demand-aggregate supply models. This
model is used because it provides a strong
theoretical rationale for the use of nominal GNP
targeting.
In the absence of any policy response, the
negative supply shock shown in figure 3 would
move the economy from equilibrium at point A
to point F in the short run and then to point G
in the long run. Monetary policy actions design-
ed to maintain the price level at its original
value would decrease the money stock to re-
duce the demand curve. In figure 3, point B is
the new short-run equilibrium following the
supply shock and the reduction in aggregate de-
mand required to keep the price level at P0. In
this case, however, price stabilization produced
a larger decline in real output than did the in-
itial negative supply shock.
On the other hand, maintaining real output at
ft would require sufficient growth in the
money stock to shift the aggregate demand
curve to the right to point C. In this case, the
original output level, ft, is maintained, but the
price level has jumped sharply. Moreover, the
inflationary impact of output stability does not
stop at point C. Because the rise in output
prices is a surprise to workers arid other input
suppliers, input prices will rise and the short-
run aggregate supply curve will shift to the
left again. Thus, even without further policy-
induced demand changes, the price level will he
driven up further; if monetary policy responds
again to maintain real output, the price spiral
will continue on\vard and upward.~
51t may seem perverse for monetary policy to attempt to
reduce real output! Recall, however, that we are abstrac-
ting from the growth in output. As a result, this seemingly
perverse policy is just the graphical analog of trying to
smooth out cyclical variations in real output that occur
along the economy’s long-run growth path.
6See Bean (1983) or Bradley and Jansen (1989) for a for-
mal demonstration of this claim.
7Point B is also a temporary position. When output is below
its natural or full employment rate, unemployment is also
high. This unemployment will eventually push down wages
and costs, moving the short-run aggregate supply curve to
the right and intersecting the long-run aggregate supply
curve at a point like D. Thus, price stabilization policy in
the natural rate model may perversely lead to deflation.
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Finally, consider what happens with nominal
income targeting. In this case, the monetary
authority adjusts the money stock to keep
nominal GNP at its target level. In this model,
the intersection of the short-run aggregate
supply and full information output after a supp-
ly shock occurs at the same level of nominal
spending as their intersection before a supply
shock. For example, in figure 3, points A and H
are intersections of full-information output and
short-tun aggregate supply before and after a
supply shock. Nominal GNP targeting requires
reducing the money supply enough to move the
economy from point F after the supply shock
occurs to point H; nominal spending at point H
is equal to nominal spending at the initial equi-
librium point A. Because a supply shock causes
short-run aggregate supply and full information
output to intersect at points of constant nominal
spending, nominal GNP targeting keeps the
economy at its full information output level.
That is, under nominal GNP targeting, the ag-
gregate demand will always intersect the short-
run aggregate supply curve at the full informa-
tion output level for any value of the supply
shock.
Nominal income targeting yields two potential
improvements over policies designed to stabilize
the price level as the level of real output. First,
nominal income targeting permits both price
and output to adjust simultaneously; thus, it
avoids more extreme movements in either price
or output alone that occur when policy is di-
rected toward stabilizing one of these variables.
Second, in the model we discuss, nominal in-
come targeting also enables the economy to
avoid the changes in nominal wages that pro-
duce a second set of adjustments. Nominal
wages will not change because nominal GNP
targeting always stabilizes output at the full in-
formation output level, the level firms would
choose to produce if they could recognize and
fully adjust to the shocks confronting them.
Thus, nominal GNP targeting responds as well
as price or output level targeting to demand
shocks and is superior to either in responding
to supply shocks, especially if policy is directed
toward keeping output at the full information
level.
TARGETING NOMINAL GNP:
COULD IT WORK IN PRACTICE?
Despite concern expressed by some commen-
tators about the division of nominal GNP into its
real GNP and price level components, nominal
GNP targeting is “perfectly” stabilizing at the on-
ly sustainable output level, the “natural” or full
information rate of output.~Monetary policy-
makers need not be concerned with anything
except the nominal GNP target itself because the
real GNP level achieved will automatically be
the full information rate of output!9
Thus, one key result of nominal GNP targeting
is that policymakers don’t have to estimate the
natural rate of output as they would under a
real GNP targeting procedure. Under nominal
GNP targeting, hitting the preannounced target
is sufficient to generate an equality between the
actual and full information rate of real GNP, even
~fthe po!icymaker knows nothing about thefull in-
formation rate ofoutput at any point in time.
The obvious question is, To what extent do
these results apply to the real economy?
(Ian the Monetary Authority Con-
trol Nominal GP~P?
Targeting nominal GNP requires that the mon-
etary authority control nominal GNP. That is, a
change in the money stock must lead to a
predictable consequent change in nominal GNP.
Few economists doubt that, in broad terms,
nominal GNP can be influenced by the mone-
tary authority. For example, the St. Louis equa-
tion, which has been used to aid policymaking
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
elsewhere, demonstrates the relationship be-
tween changes in the money stock and suhse-
tNote that this case does not rule out fluctuations in real
GNP, as shocks to the aggregate supply function will alter
real GNP and price while keeping nominal GNP constant.
These shocks to aggregate supply can be anything that af-
fects the ability of the economy to produce output, such as
changes in production technology, exogenous OPEC oil
price shocks and droughts. All ofthese factors may alter
the natural rate of output; under nominal GNP targeting,
actual real output will also change to remain equal to the
natural rate of output.
°Stabilizingnominal GNP is not a desirable goal in and of
itself; instead, it is desirable because of its impiications for
stabilizing output at the full information level. In this sense,
nominal GNP targeting actually represents an intermedi-
ate target” of policy. An intermediate target is one that is
adopted because, by achieving it, one also achieves the
ultimate policy goals.
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quent changes in nominal GNP over a period of
several quarters.1°
Of course, questions about the controllability
of nominal GNP are really questions about the
impact of money on the components of spen-
ding. They apply equally well to the price or
output level. To see this, assume that policy-
makers adopt a real GNP target. Policymakers
might proceed with the two-step procedure
described recently by Benjamin Friedman (1988),
in which policymakers first choose a target
value for real GNP, then estimate the value of
the money stock consistent with their real GNP
goal. The estimated money stock is an in-
termediate target of policy in lieu of attempting
to hit the real GNP target over periods shorter
than a quarter. This procedure works only if
achieving the money target is related to achiev-
ing the real GNP target. But such a relationship
between money and nominal GNP is exactly
what is required for nominal GNP targeting to
be practical.”
Moreover, as discussed earlier, hitting a nomi-
nal GNP target will automatically guarantee hit-
ting a real GNP level equal to the full informa-
tion rate of output. Since this is not measured
directly, but is, instead, estimated from various
sources, it is useful to know that hitting a tar-
geted nominal GNP level, that can be measured
directly, will keep real GNP at its full informa-
tion rate.t2
Do Polieymakers Know Enough
About the Economy?
A common criticism of policymaking is that
economists and policymakers do not know
enough about how the economy functions to
have a model that describes accurately the
behavior of macroeconomic variables like real
GNP and the price level. In this case, it has
been argued that policy action based on a flaw-
ed or incomplete model might cause more harm
than good. To avoid this problem, Milton Fried-
man and others have advocated policy rules
that do not depend on the state of the econ-
omy; these rules are called “non-contingent”
monetary policy rules.
Milton Friedman and others have emphasized
that “long and variable lags” exist between
changes in money aggregates and the full re-
sponse of GNP. Because the variability in these
lags is neither predictable nor well understood,
Friedman argues that ignorance of the causes
and patterns of variability in the lag structure
justifies the use of a constant money rule, such
as having a money aggregate grow at exactly 3
percent per year forever. This type of money
rule is non-contingent; that is, it does not vary
even though nominal GNP, the price level
and/or real output varies.
In contrast, nominal GNP targeting can be
achieved only with a state-contingent money
rule. For example, a rule specifying 3 percent
annual nominal GNP growth requires faster
money growth when nominal GNP growth is
less than 3 percent and slower money growth
when nominal GNP growth is above 3 percent.
In practice, nominal GNP targeting is a “feed-
back” money rule, with the feedback running
from observed GNP changes to money growth.
One approach to evaluating the potential use-
fulness of state-contingent money rules is to see
whether there is a rule whose favorable proper-
ties are robust across alternative theoretical
models. This is analogous to Bennett McCallum’s
search for a money rule with desirable proper-
ties across alternative empirical models. The
shaded insert describes a nominal GNP rule pro-
posed by McCallum that satisfies the criterion of
t0The historical reference is Andersen and Jordan (1968)
and Andersen and Carlson (1970). A recent update is
reported in Carlson (1986).
“For a critical analysis of intermediate targeting, see B.
Friedman (1975, 1988).
120ne issue in the controllability of nominal GNP arises
because nominal ONP is only observed every quarter, and
even then is available only with a lag of several weeks.
The question arises whether quarterly observations on
GNP are sufficiently timely to allow the monetary authority
totarget nominal OMP. This issue is specious. First, no
technical issue prevents more frequent (e.g., monthly)
observation of nominal ONP. Second, numerous economic
variables are observed more frequently than nominal GNP
and are related to nominal ONP both theoretically and
statistically. These can be used to forecast movements of
nominal GNP between observations. Over a decade ago,
LeRoy and Waud (1976, 1977) demonstrated that such
forecasts could be made with data observed at different
frequencies using a statistical approach known as the
Kalman filter. Thus, monthly or even weekly estimates of
nominal GNP are available as guides to policymakers.
Finally, it is important to note that alternative policies such
as price level targeting or real OMP targeting also face the
observability question. The price level and real output are
also observed quarterly, although various components of
the price level such as the Consumer Price Index and the
Wholesale Price Index are observed monthly. Thus,
targeting other variables does not avoid any problems
associated with infrequent measurements of the targeted
variable.
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generating desirable results in simulations
across a variety of empirical models.
Of course, it is difficult to evaluate the robust-
ness of a policy rule across alternative theoreti-
cal constructs; moreover, even doing so is no
guarantee that the theoretical constructs con-
sidered actually contain one that conforms
“closely” (somehow defined) to the underlying
“real-world” economy. Still, the exercise is worth
conducting, if only to pinpoint the limitations of
our knowledge of the economy. Indeed, such ig-
norance of how the economy works was pre-
cisely the reason Friedman used to advocate his
constant money growth rule.
While such an exercise is complicated by the
plethora of theoretical macroeconomic con-
structs available today, many that incorporate a
natural rate structure on the supply side seem
to show that a nominal GNP target, if achievable
on a timely basis, will better stabilize the econo-
my than a non-contingent policy rule, such as a
fixed money growth rule. The specific state-
contingent money rule found to be best, how-
ever, differs significantly across these models.
Moreover, these models essentially ignore the
effect of the lags that would be present in em-
pirically implementing the state-contingent
money rule.
After incorporating both the effect of these
lags and the inconsistencies across models in
ranking alternative state-contingent monetary
policy rules, the presumed advantages of
nominal GNP targeting become more tenuous.’3
For instance, the advantage of using nominal
GNP targeting in the model described in this
paper depends on the ability of the policymaker
to recognize and respond to changes in nominal
GNP more quickly than the private sector can
recognize and respond to shocks to the
economy. While this may seem reasonable for
the model we use, other theoretical models
yield other conclusions.
For example, one aggregate demand-supply
model generates a positively sloped aggregate
supply curve by assuming that workers have in-
complete information about the current eco-
nomic environment; specifically, they lack infor-
mation on the current prices of goods that they
purchase infrequently. Workers accept nominal
wage offers based on theirforecasts of the
price level rather than the price level itself.
Nominal wages are assumed to be set by an
auction market for labor services, in which the
wage adjusts instantaneously to current eco-
nomic conditions.” In this case, a larger-than-
expected rise in the price of all goods means
that workers’ forecast of the price level are
below the actual price level, thereby inducing
workers to accept lower nominal wage offers
than usual. Until workers discover what has
happened to the price level (which includes
observing prices for goods purchased relatively
infrequently), they will continue to offer their
labor services at a lower real wage than the one
they would demand if they were fully informed.
This lower real wage induces firms to expand
employment and output. In this alternative
framework, nominal GNP targeting may be
preferable to a fixed money rule; but price level
targeting always works to keep real GNP at the
natural rate.”
Thus, even within an aggregate demand-
supply framework, different underlying assump-
tions about how the labor market operates will
produce different evaluations of the relative
usefulness of alternative policy rules. Until
economists can agree on a model that reason-
ably explains changes in the state of the
economy, it is difficult to take the policy recom-
mendations from any particular model very
seriously. In particular, advocates of nominal
GNP targeting cannot point to overwhelming
theoretical justification for their policy recom-
mendation.16 Consequently, while the theoretical
1tBean (1983), however, demonstrates that nominal GNP
targeting in a multiple-period, wage-contracting setting is
still preferable to money targeting. In this case, the
nominal GNP target is a prospective target, in which ra-
tional forecasts of next period’s nominal GNP are held
constant while the actual value of next period’s nominal
GNP may vary with unanticipated shocks. In this case,
however, nominal GNP targeting is itself dominated by a
more general state-contingent rule. Bradley and Jansen
(1989) extend Bean’s results to a model with elastic labor
supply and wage indexing to price.
“See Rasche (1973) for an early example.
“See Bradley and Jensen (1988) for an analysis of price
level targeting in a more recent version of this model.
“An additional point in the issue of ignorance of the true
model is the well-known result of William Brainard (1967).
If the parameter values of the economic model are not
perfectly known, policymakers should respond cautiously
when employing any state-contingent policy rule, including
nominal GNP targeting. Investigating the properties of
nominal ONP targeting in a variety of theoretical or em-
pirical models is one wayto assess the importance of this
ignorance of the true model for policy prescriptions. Since
the true model is almost certainly unknown to anyone not
practicing mysticism in academic or policymaking garb,
however, the theoretical case for any state-contingent
policy rule is again weakened.
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model outlined earlier in this paper strongly
supports the usefulness of nominal GNP target-
ing, a similar model that differs only in the
underlying assumptions about the labor market
suggests that price level targeting is superior to
nominal GNP targeting.
CONCLUSION
The potential usefulness of nominal GNP tar-
geting for monetary policy purposes has gained
widespread attention in recent years. Nominal
GNP targeting has several useful features in the
context of a simple theoretical model; chief
among them is the stabilization of real GNP at
its natural rate of output. Moi-eover, this stabili-
zation occurs automatically, without monetary
policymakers having to know what the natural
i-ate of output actually is. Finally, in the case of
demand (but not supply) shocks, nominal GNP
targeting will also provide price level stabilization.
While nominal GNP targeting may he superior
theoretically to alternative policy targets, several
problems arise when considering real-world ap-
plications of nominal GNP targeting. Ignorance
of the correct equations, parameter values and
lag structure that characterize the U.S. economy
reduces the appeal of nominal GNP targeting.
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